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Kyiv: The Keystone Jewel of Europe

Written · Konstantin Anthony Romanov

A refugee’s proposal for a sovereign Ukraine, durable peace, reconstruction, and a Kyiv Eurasian Compact.

A Follow-Up Letter & Proposal for a Eurasian Economic Zone
The Kyiv Eurasian Compact — presented to the United Nations General Assembly

Letter by: Konstantin Anthony Romanov
To: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Donald J. Trump, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and the European Parliament

For consideration also by the European Council, European Commission, Council of the European Union, relevant national governments, the United Nations, and the regional and financial institutions identified below.

In this letter

Excellencies, distinguished leaders and representatives,

Why I Write

I write as an independent civilian, not as a representative of any government, military alliance, economic bloc, or the United Nations.

I also write as a refugee from Luhansk—Lugansk, as I knew it growing up—now living in the United States. For me, the Donbas is not a colored band on a military map. It is the cornfield of my childhood, the school where I spent first and second grade, the Golden Plum Tree, and the faces of family members I have not held in nearly thirty years.

In 2022, as the full-scale invasion swallowed the country, I knew the panic of being unable to reach Baby Cousin Maxim or my Auntie Lena. I went to retrieve my Ukrainian passport from the San Francisco Ukrainian consulate unsuccessfully as I learned the war was really underway and they were handing out AK-47’s to any able bodied person arriving at Kyiv airport, carrying in one small document the weight of a home I could not reach and a family divided by borders, armies, and time.

I have built a life in America, but exile does not sever the moral claim of home. It teaches how long a human being can endure uncertainty—and how much stubborn hope it takes to keep believing that return, reunion, and reconstruction remain possible.

That is why this is not, for me, an abstract exercise in geopolitics. I write to pursue a fresh path toward a common understanding: a free, sovereign Ukraine, capable of defending itself and choosing its future, at the center of a negotiated framework for peace, reconstruction, and commerce across Eurasia.

A settlement worthy of the name cannot merely freeze front lines or silence guns. It must let children sleep without terror, families find one another, refugees return voluntarily and safely, and communities rebuild without surrendering their independence.

My earlier proposal, “The Eurasian Economic Zone: Ukraine’s Saving Grace”, argued that economic cooperation could help change the incentives sustaining this war. This letter develops that idea into the Kyiv Eurasian Compact. It is an invitation to examine a possible settlement, not a claim that the parties have accepted one, and not a promise that trade alone can prevent another war.

Before any proposed address to the United Nations General Assembly, I ask the governments and institutions concerned to examine these terms directly. Our measure of success should be whether ordinary people can live without fear: whether children are safe, families can return home, and communities can rebuild without surrendering their independence.

Finish the New Silk Road

The objective is not to place Ukraine under a new authority or compel it to choose economic subordination to East or West. It is to explore how Ukrainian reconstruction could connect the European Union, the economies of the Eurasian Economic Union, Central Asia, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative through mutually agreed projects.

There are foundations on which to build. The World Bank’s Middle Corridor study examines transport connections across Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and the reforms and investment needed to improve them. The EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provide another practical basis for connecting Ukrainian trade with European markets. Ukraine’s electricity system is already synchronized with Continental Europe. These are separate arrangements, not an existing unified economic zone. [1] [2] [3]

I propose a feasibility program for rail and road connections, intermodal terminals, ports, digital customs, resilient electricity networks, and productive industry. Odesa and other Ukrainian gateways should be assessed alongside routes through the Caucasus, Türkiye, Moldova, and neighboring EU states. No route should be presumed viable before demand, rail-gauge compatibility, border delays, maritime risk, environmental impact, and total delivered cost have been tested.

Connecting markets is not the same as merging customs unions. Customs union and common commercial policy fall within the EU’s exclusive competences, while the EAEU has its own customs and external-trade architecture. This compact therefore proposes negotiated interfaces and project agreements, not simultaneous Ukrainian membership in incompatible customs arrangements. Its terms must respect Ukraine’s European integration and applicable obligations. [4] [5]

Territory Must Be Part of the Settlement

The starting point must be sovereign equality, peaceful settlement, and the prohibition on force against another state’s territorial integrity. These principles are not bargaining privileges reserved for powerful countries; they are foundations of the United Nations Charter. [6]

I ask the Russian Federation to negotiate restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty throughout Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory, including Crimea and Sevastopol and the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.

General Assembly resolutions 68/262 and ES-11/4 provide the relevant international baseline on territorial integrity and non-recognition of attempted changes by force. [7] [8]

I do not claim that Moscow has accepted territorial restoration, or that economic incentives guarantee its acceptance. I propose that territorial restoration, security, reconstruction, and lawful economic cooperation be negotiated explicitly as related parts of a settlement, without making humanitarian relief conditional on a commercial bargain.

Neutral Does Not Mean Defenseless

Ukraine could consider permanent military neutrality only through its own lawful democratic and constitutional processes. No foreign government may make that choice for Ukrainians. A proposed neutral Ukraine would retain armed forces, air defenses, a defense industry, and the inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter. [6]

Switzerland demonstrates that neutrality can be armed: its official explanation describes readiness to defend its territory as part of that policy. It offers a comparison, not a ready-made settlement for Ukraine. Ukraine’s geography, wartime experience, constitutional commitments, and European aspirations require terms of its own. [9]

Any agreement would have to define nonalignment, foreign military presence, defense cooperation, access to equipment and training, and the relationship between neutrality and outside assistance after an attack. Neutrality without the capacity to resist renewed aggression would not provide the security this proposal seeks.

A Security Guarantee With More Than One Pillar

A settlement needs a credible Ukrainian defense capacity; reliable monitoring with access to relevant sites; independent attribution of violations; and specific, lawful, funded commitments to assist Ukraine if it is attacked again. A party accused of breaching the settlement should not be able to veto the assessment of its own conduct or paralyze the agreed response.

The Paris Declaration published by the Council of the EU already describes proposed monitoring, long-term support for Ukraine’s armed forces, and commitments concerning a future attack. Those proposals are relevant reference points, not evidence that their participants endorse this compact. Their compatibility with any Ukrainian choice of neutrality would need to be negotiated rather than assumed. [10]

Black Sea arrangements must address civilian navigation, mines, port security, insurance, and incident reporting, with coastal states participating in decisions that affect them. Nuclear safety and protection of energy infrastructure require their own technical arrangements. The United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the International Maritime Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency should be invited to advise within their mandates and subject to the necessary consent. [11] [12] [13]

Kyiv as the Jewel of Eastern Europe

Ukraine should gain more than transit fees. Reconstruction should create skilled work, competitive manufacturing, agricultural value chains, reliable power, housing, and opportunities for displaced families to return voluntarily and safely.

Kyiv could become a jewel of Eastern Europe because its people are secure and its institutions trusted—not merely because international freight passes through it.

The EU’s Ukraine Investment Framework and the U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund provide existing institutional reference points for financing discussions. Neither constitutes an allocation to this proposal. Eligibility, investment decisions, procurement, sanctions compliance, debt sustainability, and environmental and social safeguards must remain independently assessed. [14] [15]

I invite the World Bank Group, including its relevant investment and guarantee institutions; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the European Investment Bank; the Asian Development Bank; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to consider technical dialogue where their mandates, country eligibility, and policies permit. Participation, lending, insurance, or guarantees should never be announced on their behalf. [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

I propose transparent project selection, publication of material contracts and beneficial ownership, independent audit, local consultation, and a grievance process. Financing should be released against verified milestones. No unsupported forecast of hundreds of billions or trillions in trade should substitute for project-level evidence.

There Is One More Reality

Economic interdependence does not make war impossible. Railways, pipelines, ports, and financial commitments can become instruments of coercion as well as cooperation. This framework must therefore preserve diversified routes and suppliers, lawful exit provisions, accountable institutions, and Ukraine’s ability to protect itself.

Any sanctions relief would require decisions by the authorities competent to grant it and should be linked to verified implementation. This is not a proposal to bypass sanctions, erase responsibility, extinguish lawful claims, or exchange accountability for investment.

The affected people must remain at the center: Ukrainian municipalities, displaced families, veterans, women, workers, businesses, and Crimean Tatar representatives. Prisoners, missing persons, separated families, and children unlawfully transferred or deported require urgent attention. Recovery must protect language, faith, culture, property, and equal citizenship. Humanitarian measures should proceed wherever possible while political negotiations continue.

For refugees like me, every negotiation is measured against one stubborn question: will it make reunion possible, or make exile permanent?

No diplomatic formula is humane if families remain unreachable, children remain unsafe, or people are told that the price of peace is the erasure of the home they remember.

There are no foreign children. There are only children.

Ukrainian and Russian civilians alike possess a human dignity no border, flag, alliance, or grievance can cancel. The purpose of security, diplomacy, and reconstruction must be to protect them—not to convert another generation into evidence for the next war.

To the Original Five Parties—and Every Relevant Partner

To Ukraine: lead the process and define the terms under which your people could consent.

To Russia: consider territorial restoration and a negotiated security framework instead of indefinite war.

To the United States: help develop credible guarantees and lawful reconstruction support.

To China: examine commercially sound connections without creating political dependency.

To the European Parliament, European Council, Council of the European Union, Commission, and member states: contribute within your respective responsibilities and in a manner compatible with Ukraine’s European future.

No continental project can be designed by five capitals alone. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye, Moldova, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria must help shape routes that involve them. Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan should participate wherever their territory, institutions, or commerce are concerned, subject to applicable legal restrictions.

The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, other willing partners, and relevant NATO institutions should be included in discussions within their competence; none should be assigned an obligation without consent. Switzerland could contribute experience in armed neutrality and good offices. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates could be invited to support mediation, humanitarian work, or investment. India, Brazil, South Africa, and other interested states could help broaden international participation.

These are proposed invitations, not a distribution record or a claim of endorsement. Governments, regional bodies, transport operators, investors, development institutions, and affected communities would have different roles. A negotiating forum must distinguish political consent, security obligations, technical advice, commercial participation, and public oversight.

I ask each principal recipient to designate a diplomatic or technical point of contact to assess participation in a Ukrainian-led exploratory process, with the Secretary-General’s good offices where accepted. Within a proposed ninety days of its establishment, working groups should present options on territorial restoration and security; humanitarian measures and recovery; and transport, energy, trade, and financing. The initial result should be a jointly reviewed issues paper and a costed feasibility agenda—not a declaration of commitments that do not exist.

Let the letter come first as an invitation to substantive dialogue. Any subsequent General Assembly presentation should accurately reflect the responses received and proceed only through an authorized speaking arrangement.

We owe ordinary people more than another explanation of why peace is difficult.

I know what it is to watch a homeland become an argument in rooms far away, and to see the names of familiar places reduced to military objectives. I also know that survival can harden into purpose. Nearly thirty years of distance have not extinguished my hope of reunion; war has not persuaded me that permanent division is inevitable.

Do not ask refugees to accept permanent exile as realism. Do not ask families to call separation peace. Give Ukrainians a peace strong enough to live in, just enough to return to, and durable enough that Russian families need not fear the next mobilization or the next grave.

Let us examine whether a sovereign Ukraine—and Kyiv, the keystone jewel of Europe—can become a meeting place between economies rather than a permanent battlefield between powers.

With deepest respect and hope for a brighter, peaceful future,

Konstantin Anthony Romanov
Independent civilian proposal

References

Numbered citations identify supporting documents or institutional websites; they do not signify endorsement. Proposed terms, invitations, and timelines are the author’s recommendations.

  1. World Bank — Middle Trade and Transport Corridor. Regional connectivity and the need for coordinated investment and policy reforms. worldbank.org
  2. European Commission — EU–Ukraine Solidarity Lanes. Ukraine is connected to European transport networks. transport.ec.europa.eu
  3. European Commission — EU–Ukraine energy cooperation. Grid synchronization and energy-market integration. energy.ec.europa.eu
  4. European Union — Division of competences. Customs union and common commercial policy are exclusive EU competences. eur-lex.europa.eu
  5. Eurasian Economic Commission — EAEU trade regulation guidance. EAEU customs and external trade architecture. PDF
  6. United Nations Charter. Sovereignty, peaceful settlement, prohibition on force, and self-defense. un.org
  7. UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262. Territorial integrity of Ukraine and the status of Crimea. docs.un.org
  8. UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/4. Rejection of attempted annexation of four Ukrainian regions. docs.un.org
  9. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs — Neutrality. Armed neutrality provides a comparison, not an automatic solution for Ukraine. eda.admin.ch
  10. Council of the European Union — Paris Declaration on security guarantees for Ukraine. Existing proposals for deterrence, monitoring, and support; not endorsement of this compact. consilium.europa.eu
  11. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. osce.org
  12. International Maritime Organization. imo.org
  13. International Atomic Energy Agency. iaea.org
  14. European Commission — Ukraine Investment Framework. Existing reconstruction financing mechanisms; no funding commitment to this proposal. enlargement.ec.europa.eu
  15. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation — U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund. Potential institutional building block subject to independent eligibility and approval. dfc.gov
  16. World Bank Group. worldbank.org
  17. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. ebrd.com
  18. European Investment Bank. eib.org
  19. Asian Development Bank. adb.org
  20. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. aiib.org